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The assumption that large complex projects should be managed in order to reduce 
uncertainty and increase predictability is not new. What is relatively new, however, is 
that uncertainty reduction can and should be obtained through formal risk 
management approaches. We question both assumptions by addressing a more 
fundamental question about the role of knowledge in current risk management 
practices. Inquiries into the predominant approaches to risk management in large 
infrastructure and construction projects reveal their assumptions about knowledge and 
we discuss the ramifications these have for project and construction management. Our 
argument and claim is that predominant risk management approaches tends to 
reinforce conventional ideas of project control whilst undermining other notions of 
value and relevance of built assets and project management process. These 
approaches fail to consider the role and potential value of knowledge production 
during the project process, instead seeing knowledge as an input into upfront planning 
and specification. We examine ways in which actual project practices approach the 
question of risk management for the case of large public hospital building and 
infrastructure projects in Denmark. These projects are characterized by long durations 
involving substantial materiality, high uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity. Yet, 
they are also subjected to risk management that operates according to a standardized 
‘best practice’ control approach – as if these hospital and infrastructure projects are 
quite simple, predictive and similar in nature. The cases reveal the emerging 
uncertainties that challenge the project plan and the risk management approach as 
new knowledge about the conditions are produced during the project processes. The 
paper concludes by proposing a more dynamic understanding of the role of 
knowledge, considering the practical implications of uncertain knowledge conditions 
as a prevailing condition for construction management rather than something to be 
known in advanced and reduced by risk management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The [ideal knowledge] conditions required for it to be relevant to talk of risk are not 
met. We know that we do not know, but that is almost all we know: there is no better 
definition of uncertainty” (Callon et al. 2009, p. 21). 
During the last two decades scholars within management and organization studies, 
sociology and economics have developed a renewed interest in the concept of risk, 
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dealing with classical topics such as gambling, occupational and operational risks as 
well as more recent and encompassing topics and notions such as ‘risk society’, 
’world risk society’ (Beck 2009) ‘enterprise risk management’ and ‘the risk 
management of everything’ (Power 2004). According to Power (2004) ideals about 
more and better control are underpinning the recent expansion of risk management 
practices across organizations and societies. Best practice approaches to project 
management have long since promoted control with a corresponding role for project 
management: a key role and responsibility of project management is about ensuring 
ongoing monitoring and control so that the project can be executed efficiently and 
accurately and delivered according to predictions. That is, according to a set goal and 
plan (Turner et al., 2010, Flyvbjerg 2006). The reduction of uncertainty to ensure 
execution according to a set goal and plan is integral to the control ideal in ‘best 
practice’ project management. 
During the last two decades an increasing numbers of scholars in project research 
have addressed a number of critical issues and limitations associated with uncertainty 
reduction and control such as; the project’s lack of effectiveness and loss of relevance 
in the wider stakeholder environment (Christensen and Kreiner (1991), Kreiner 
(1995), the lack of a broader value-orientation (Morris, 2010), the reduction of 
robustness and reliability in organizational performance due a false sense of control 
and certainty (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001, Coutu 2003). A key argument across several 
contributions concerns the conditions of knowledge in temporary project settings. 
Knowledge about the project and task is always uncertain, especially in the beginning 
of the temporary project when few actions have been taken and relatively little is 
known. Christensen and Kreiner (1991), Kreiner (1995), Lundin and Söderholm 
(1995), Engwall (2002), Jönsson (2004), Atkinson et al. (2006) and Lindkvist (2011) 
have all emphasized the contextual complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of 
temporary project settings. Alongside these conditions, Van Marrewijk (2007) noted 
the prevalence of rituals and cultural values governing mega-infrastructure projects 
and Winch (2002) noted the existence of wicked problems in construction projects. 
These are problems that are uncertain in the sense of being ill-defined and without an 
optimal solution. In brief then, the conventional control approach to projects and 
project management has been questioned for being reductionist when dealing with 
uncertainty, biased in favour of predictability and efficiency in execution while 
disregarding the project context and longer term perspective after the project is handed 
over and its results are put to use.  
The distinction between uncertainty and risk is integral to the above discussion. As 
noted by Chapman and Ward (2011) uncertainty management can be better than risk 
management insofar as the former implies further consideration of potential 
favourable opportunities, benefits and outcomes, in contrast to the more limited notion 
of risk management which tends to deal with the unfavourable costs and outcomes. 
However, as also noted by Power (2004) there seems to be more to this distinction. 
When the economist Frank Knight (1921) introduced the distinction between 
uncertainty and risk it was, according to Langlois and Cosgel (1993), to address a 
more fundamental uncertainty that goes beyond assigning probabilities to more or less 
favourable outcomes. The latter presuppose that we at least have knowledge of 
concepts to classify outcomes, although we might not know their probability 
distribution. Knight reserved the notion of risk for such situations and states that are 
sufficiently known to be measured and calculated. “By contrast, uncertainty as Knight 
understood it arises from the impossibility of exhaustive classification of states”, that 
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is, when the knowledge and conceptual categories are themselves unknown. (Langlois 
and Cosgel, 1993, p. 459 – 460). Thus, according to a Knightian distinction, the 
concept of uncertainty is broader in scope and implication than the concept of risk – 
while the latter can be subjected to quantifications and calculations, the former cannot. 
Instead, when actors are confronted with uncertainty, they must rely on judgment and 
intuition. As noted by Winch and Maytorena (2009) the distinction between 
uncertainty and risk was carried into management and organization research through 
the work of March and Simon (1958). Simon (1983) in turn questioned the 
contemplative ‘cold’ cognitive bias of much previous work on decision-making in 
organizations, especially associated with rational choice and the so called subjective 
expected utility theory. Instead, Simon proposed a model based on intuition and 
emotion, drawing attention to ‘hot cognitions’. Hot cognitions are related to surprise 
and sudden discovery as well as the excitement these provoke. This notion carries 
further associations to March (1971) work on ‘technology of foolishness’ and the 
distinction between exploration (of yet unknown and hence uncertain worlds) and 
exploitation (within a relatively well known universe). 
Some more recent contributions have also addressed possible complementary 
perspectives on uncertainty and risk management. Corvellec (2009) draws attention to 
the usefulness of silent, non-explicit non-formalized risk management practices. 
While Flyvbjerg (2006) points to the usefulness and importance of accuracy and the 
reference class forecasting method as a way to facilitate better control and 
predictability of large complex infrastructure projects and outcomes, Millo and 
MacKenzie (2009) point to the usefulness of inaccurate models and methods. 
According to them, the success of a forecasting method can depend on its usefulness 
in practice and thus be independent of the method’s more or less predictive powers 
and expert knowledge. For example, organizational actors might adopt a particular 
forecasting method because it helps them to make fast and efficient calculations and 
decisions, and in turn, justify those calculations and decisions, and to communicate 
with others about issues of mutual interest. This is a rather different utility that the 
classic argument about making reality and the project more certain. Millo and 
Mackenzie's (2008) idea of inaccuracy, Callon and Law (2005) on qualculation as a 
continuum between judgment and calculation, Callon et al.'s (2009) emphasis on 
action in an uncertain world as opposed decision, choice and risk, and Latour (2002) 
on technical action, all point towards the active and performative role of technical 
devices in enacting and shaping the world they help to describe. Beck (1999) seems to 
allude to something similar when he comments on what an emphasis on the notion of 
risk and risk society implies:  
“So risk is man-made hybrids […the notion of risk…] is the way the ‘hybrid society’ 
watches, describes, values, criticizes its own hybridity” (Beck 1999, p. 146). 
In our reading, the emphasis on risk can be for better or worse and should be 
examined empirically alongside a less instrumental notion of acting and preforming 
within uncertain knowledge conditions. Below, we present empirical material from 
studies of two large infrastructure projects in Denmark; the current Danish hospital 
building programme which represents the largest ever public infrastructure investment 
in the country at some 42 billion DKK (£46 billion), and the 13 year, 3.2 billion Euro 
Danish rail signalling infrastructure redevelopment programme. Both cases 
demonstrate the complex interplay of risk and uncertainty in large projects, as well as 
the tension between risk management producing knowledge about project conditions 
'out there' and risk management performing and reifying those conditions. In the 
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context of our work we focus on risk management practices in projects, but 
complement this with a particular focus on the possible complex dynamics and 
exchanges between a more or less uncertain project condition and the risk 
management practices that are used to manage those uncertain conditions. More 
specifically we ask how risk management practices shape project conditions for large 
construction and infrastructure projects and with what ramifications for knowledge 
and project- and construction management roles. 
CASES AND METHOD 
Both cases are on-going in terms of data collection. The “Kvalitetsfonden” hospital 
building programme data to date consists of a combination of interviews with actors 
from the Danish Regions state client organisation and built environment organisations 
involved in the design and construction of several of the individual hospitals that 
constitute the programme, along with attendance at public and closed project 
meetings, and documentary data. The documentary data is significant given the extent 
of public domain reports and media coverage. The signalling programme data consists 
primary of long-term participant observation within the projects from the end of 2009 
when the programme received the go-ahead, combined with interviews and 
documentary data conducted and collected during this period also.  
RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE DANISH HOSPITAL BUILDING PROGRAM 
 “Kvalitetsfonden”, the current building and renovation program for the Danish 
hospitals is the largest public investment in physical infrastructure ever seen in 
Denmark. With a total budget of 42 billion Danish crowns (DKK), the 
“Kvalitetsfonden” involves 16 hospital construction projects ranging from significant 
rebuild and renovations of existing hospitals, through green field projects, university 
hospitals to so called ‘super hospitals’ with individual project budgets between 4 and -
6.5 billion DKK. During the start-up of the program in early 2008 the client and 
umbrella organization for public hospital care, Danish Regions, requested help from 
the well-known consultancy firm KPMG to advice on how to manage the risks in such 
a complex building program. KPMG was at that time about to deliver their final report 
to the Danish state concerning a public inquiry into the new building for Danish 
Radio. The project became infamous for being late and for going over budget by 1.7 
billion DKK. According to KPMG and Grant Thorton (2008), the deviations from the 
time schedule and budget were due to a lack of overall control and inadequate 
calibration and use of the risk management tools. The tool in use, “successive 
calculation” should have been calibrated differently in order to assess and 
communicating the actual risks.  
With this track-record KPMG seemed well prepared to advise the Danish Regions on 
risk matters in large public constructions projects. The report (KPMG 2008) 
introduced the potential benefits of “successive calculation” supplemented with case 
scenarios such as worst, best and most likely along with the suggestion to identify the 
“top-ten” risk and uncertainty factors for the construction project (appendix, p.34). 
The National Audit Office (NAO) assumed a particular task and responsibility of 
monitoring the ways in which the different constituencies managed the execution of 
each of the projects as well as the overall programme. The NAO ( Rigsrevisionen, 
2010) urged the regions to increase the focus on risk management in each project, 
citing the KPMG (2008) report. In NAO ( Rigsrevisionen, 2011) the focus on project 
risk was reinforced and extended to the Ministry of Health:  
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“Rigsrevisionen [NAO] notes that construction projects of such scale and complexity 
involve risks. It is therefore essential that the Ministry of Health specifies and meets 
its responsibilities as manager of the grants and supervisor to ensure that the 
construction projects are implemented within the total budget framework”.  
The regions, as client are, however, still in NAO’s focus: 
“The regions should throughout the construction process be focused on risk 
management and ensuring robust and competent building organizations in order to 
achieve the objectives set for the construction projects within the budget framework.” 
(p. 3. English in original).  
What prompted NAO to reinforce the focus on risk management and budget control 
among the constituencies was the disturbing news, that one of the largest projects in 
the program was reported to have a significant risk of going more than 1.2 billion 
DKK over budget. 
The Ministry of Health (Ministeriet for Sundhed og Forebyggelse, 2012) took swift 
action, used the KPMG (2008) model for project reporting and elaborated upon it to 
include a traffic light model for how each of the project risks concerning budget, time 
and quality could be assessed and then stipulated that each project organization should 
use this standard format and report accordingly on a quarterly basis. During this 
period, there were also emerging concerns within the project organizations about how 
to best estimate the risks. A risk manager in one of the projects considered it to be an 
extraordinarily difficult and uncertain task to estimate risks on a large and complex 
hospital construction project with a completion time 10 years in the future.  
“Frankly speaking, nobody knows if we will be on, below or even twice beyond the 
budget or more [!]”  
Another, and perhaps more damning concern, was the certainty and the rigidity of the 
authorized budget frame – as if it was being “made of stone”. This rigidity was 
considered to be potentially detrimental for the resulting hospital. Given the 
uncertainty and complexity of the task and project it would be better to have more 
flexibility so that the project plan and design could adapt to new and still unknown 
technological solutions, and social and health trends. This would benefit the new 
hospital when in operation. But within the budgetary constraints, even if long term 
operational advantages using alternative technological solutions could be 
demonstrated using an impeccable investment calculus as support, it would not be 
possible to negotiate for the extra money. Everything had to be accounted for within 
the existing project budget, the risk manager explained, while adding that the current 
risk management set-up appeared to be more about bureaucratic control within the 
confined space of the project budget and less about the longer term quality, benefits 
and value for the hospital in use.  
However, when the NAO (Rigsrevisionen, 2013) returned with a new status report for 
the hospitals under construction it was with a somewhat different focus. The focus 
was no longer primarily about the project economy and the risk of exceeding the 
construction budget, but rather about the longer term ‘total economy’ for the coming 
hospital in use. KPMG (2008) was again part of the argument, with the NAO ( 
Rigsrevisionen, 2013) reminding the regions about total economy being an important 
criterion for public constructions since long before the hospital programme. Another 
reminder concerns the specific requirement for funding, that each project must 
demonstrate a certain level of increased efficiency and productivity in hospital 
Harty, Themsen and Tryggestad 
1258 
operations compared to a cost baseline defined at the point of project approval. NAO 
thus urged the regions and project owners to calculate the productivity gains and ‘total 
economy’. But uncertainty is at least implicitly recognised: 
“In connection with kvalitetsfondsbyggerierne the possibility of using a calculus of the 
total economy is limited due to the fixed [budget] frame for each construction, which 
cannot be exceeded. This means, that the regions can only implement solutions that 
are possible within the allocated [budget] frame” (p. 31Translated from Danish). 
The NAO seem to express the concern that the longer term total economy of the 
hospitals 'in use' might have to pay for the rigidities associated with a ‘fixed’ 
construction budget at the commencement of the project. It further appears that the 
rigidities of the risk control set-up the risk manager at one of the projects warned 
against two years earlier, was about to return back to NAO as an emerging and quite 
complex issue about risks produced by the current risk management system itself. 
Although still framed in terms of the need for budget control and classic risk 
management, the issue of uncertainly and lack of flexibility over the long term has re-
entered the discussion. 
RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE DANISH EUR 3.2 BILLION RAILWAYS “SIGNALLING
PROGRAMME” 
In 2006 the Danish Ministry of Transport, encouraged by the Danish Ministry of 
Finance, implemented new formal requirements for dealing with uncertainty on large 
transportation infrastructure projects. As with the later hospital projects the Danish 
Ministry of Finance had grown tired of repeatedly having to deal with cost overruns 
on large infrastructure projects (Finansministeriet, 2010). In an attempt to avoid this, 
formal risk management was introduced to support management accounting control 
practices (Transportministeriet, 2006). In contrast to the hospital projects, however, 
successive calculation was banned as the Danish Ministry of Finance and the Danish 
Ministry of Transport blamed this principle for leading to inaccurate cost estimates 
(Finansministeriet, 2010). Instead, they emphasized that budgets had to be produced 
using known prices and quantities and a fixed contingency reserve of 30 percent had 
to be added on top of that. As this was only to be granted under strict requirements, 
however, formal risk management was introduced so make sure that uncertain events 
were dealt with so that project objectives could be achieved with greater certainty.  
The Danish Ministry of Finance and the Danish Ministry of Transport, however, were 
unfamiliar with how to approach the construction of these new practices; they needed 
therefore to test this somehow. At that time, the need for a total replacement of the 
Danish railways signalling equipment was at hand. In the years leading up to 2006, the 
Danish railways signalling equipment had been decaying to the point that train 
operation was regularly being affected (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006). Also, the 
National Audit Office had been criticizing the management accounting practices of 
the state-owned enterprise that manages the rail infrastructure, Rail Net Denmark, for 
being unsatisfactory (Rigsrevisionen, 2002, 2004, 2005). As parliament decided to 
approve of the total replacement of the signalling systems that same year - what was 
later to become the Signalling Programme - the Danish Ministry of Transport and the 
Danish Ministry of Finance saw this as a clear business case for implementing formal 
risk management for the first time. 
The Signalling Programme runs from 2009 until 2020/21 and has been separated into 
three main subprojects; the regional lines west, the regional line east and the 
Copenhagen mass transit system. It has been approved with a EUR 3.2 billion total 
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capital cost budget and employs the first holistic practice of risk management to be 
attempted with large transportation infrastructure projects in Denmark. It employs on 
average more than 120 people whereof at least two-third of these are externally hired 
consultants. It uses the best practice approach to risk management as defined by the 
Project Management Institute, which has come to be the best-practice approach to be 
applied across the Ministry of Transport’s domain (PMBOK). This means that it 
draws upon a cause-and-effect based logic where actors have to define those events 
that have either positive or negative effects on the project's objectives; utilizes the 
commonly used “traffic light assessment matrix” where risks are assessed using the 
probability times consequence logic; requires risk reducing actions to be undertaken 
and then compared to that assessment; and for them to be monitored, controlled, and 
reported on throughout the lifetime of the programme. It further enforces the use of a 
very complex IT-based management control system so to calculate risk values and 
allow for a decentralized use by project managers while still maintaining a centralized 
control by a few actors. It builds on the logic of setting a risk appetite and then 
comparing the calculated risk value against this so to make sure that, at worst, this 
value stays below the 30 percent contingency reserve included in the budget. It has 
been argued by several key actors, however, that the purpose is more to show reducing 
values than to actually compare this against the contingency reserve as risk value 
estimates rarely compare with budgeted and actual cost. 
The practice (the programme) has been described as very successful by the Ministry 
of Finance and also those involved find it very useful. The case, however, reveals that 
several problems exist with this practice. One of these is that even though you include 
risks into the control system and agree that this poses a threat against the objectives of 
the programme, sometimes you cannot do anything about it. This was evident when 
one of the very large Danish entrepreneur companies went bankrupt. This event sent 
ripples throughout the sector as many smaller contractors employed by this company, 
Pihl and Son, were brought down with them. In the Signalling Programme this had 
been taken into consideration but to actually reduce this risk to zero, this would have 
required that contracts had been prepared with other large entrepreneurs, who then 
would have had to sign them so to avoid delays incurring. If this had been done it 
would have cost millions, and since no one expected this to happen, it seemed like an 
extreme measure to take at that time. It did help to create awareness of the possibility, 
and slack had been included in the schedule to deal with such events, but it did not 
decrease the costs that were subsequently incurred when a new contractor had to be 
found. As it turned out, everything worked out as the programme did have adequate 
time scales to deal with such unexpected uncertainties, but it has resulted in 
compressed deadlines so that further uncertainties incurring could topple the house of 
cards and thus points the problem: did the use of risk management, and the investment 
in risk management tools and practices, actually reduce any costs in this case? 
Another unexpected consequence refers to the fact that only those uncertainties that 
can be described using the before mentioned cause-and-effect oriented logic can be 
included as a risk – but that require a high degree of existing, validated knowledge, 
which rarely exists on unique projects running over long period of time. On multiple 
occasions this had led to frustration from the project managers as they have not always 
been able to produce justified explanations. As the project runs for approximately 12 
years and thus could be prone to many unexpected events, removing any ability to 
accommodate the gut-feelings, hunches, and intuition of actors with years of 
experience seems in itself risky. In one example, a project manager was very sceptical 
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of a newly signed contract with a supplier because he knew from experience that this 
supplier always makes mistakes. However, this was excluded as it could not be 
accounted for within the risk management system. Two years later, that same supplier 
made a significant design mistake that made the signalling hardware too heavy, 
several trains were grounded and new timetables with reduced train operations almost 
had to be made which would have caused a major media scandal. 
This relates to another situation; namely that once the initial project description has 
been made and the budget approved, the practice of risk management focuses on this 
now fixed capital budget – and not the effects of their work on the later operations 
budget. This means that the practice only accepts those risks into the system that can 
be referred back to the initial capital budget. The quality or long term suitability of the 
budget, the effects its design has on later maintenance and operation – and not least 
the effects on other entities such as train operators - are excluded as risks within the 
programme. As an example, at one risk management meeting, a safety manager was 
discussing with a head subproject manager about raising the impact assessment of a 
certain risk because new events, as he argued, had caused them to face even more 
uncertainty than before. The head subproject manager found this to be straight up 
ridiculous as such a high assessment just seemed unrealistic. The two participants 
continued to discuss this but the situations seemed deadlocked as no one was willing 
to agree with the other party. At that time the safety manager had not mentioned that 
the impact would be on later operations. As the head manager during the debate 
suddenly became aware that the reason for the proposed higher assessment related to 
this, the deadlock was broken, because now he could explain to the safety manager 
that because the practice focused on the objectives of the programme and not later 
operations this higher assessment was irrelevant for the programme. The safety 
manager looked surprised but as the head subproject manager's words were backed by 
a risk consultant participating, who explained him that that was the rules of the 
practice, the discussion was cut short. In short, this situation illustrates that when risks 
have effects on anything else but the capital budget (or the chances to meet this), such 
as later operations, they are excluded from the practice as risks, and ignored. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Three tentative conclusions spring to mind when examining these brief case 
descriptions. The first involves what gets lost through the enforcement of rational risk 
management processes. From the inability to include the ‘hunches’ of experienced 
engineers in the signalling case, to the threat of losing sight of the longer term value of 
the hospital projects as the rigidities of budget and risk control close off more 
ambitious future oriented thinking, relevance is lost and the hot cognitions and 
opportunities for foolishness are reduced. The second concerns the problem of a focus 
on identifying the responsibilities for specific risks, promoting a short sighted and 
self-interested approach to management, as seen with the dismissal of operational 
risks as unimportant for the delivery of the capital programme in the signalling case. 
Both of these conclusions suggest the partiality of existing risk management practices, 
and both represent in themselves potential longer term threats to the societal and 
economic value of the projects. Our third conclusion is that both cases involve the 
application of calculative practices to very uncertain contexts. We are not necessarily 
dismissing the utility of existing risk management practices, but it does need to be 
recognised that this is a practice of trying to rationally calculate under uncertain 
knowledge conditions, and that there might be other more inclusive ways of thinking 
about risk and uncertainty. We began this paper with Callon’s reminder of what 
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uncertainty is – something we do and cannot know. Embracing and responding to this 
in ways which complement more instrumental notions of risk management may have 
significant implications for risk management practice, but also produce significant 
benefits for the delivery and overall value of large infrastructure projects. 
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